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FOURTH AMENDMENT-OFFICER
SAFETY AND THE PROTECTIVE
AUTOMOBILE SEARCH: AN
EXPANSION OF THE PAT-
DOWN FRISK
Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Michigan v. Long,' the United States Supreme Court concluded
that a police officer's protective search for weapons in the passenger
compartment of a car does not violate the fourth amendment 2 when,
absent probable cause, the officer possesses a reasonable belief that the
suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon.
3
The Court justified this decision on the basis of Terry v. Ohio4 which
allowed a police officer to conduct a pat-down frisk for weapons without
probable cause because the officer possessed a reasonable belief that the
suspect was armed and dangerous.
The Court in Long, by permitting an area search of the passenger
compartment of an automobile, extended Ter, beyond the narrow con-
fines of a limited body search. This extension is consistent with the ra-
tionale of Terry. The reasoning that permits a Terry pat-down frisk of an
individual applies with equal force to a search of the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile. The application of Terr, to an automobile, how-
' 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
2 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
3 103 S. Ct. at 3480-81.
4 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Tey, a police officer observed three men surreptitiously "casing"
a store and suspected they were planning a robbery. Although the officer did not have prob-
able cause to arrest, he approached the men. Because the officer feared that the suspects were
armed, he conducted a pat-down frisk of one of the suspect's outer clothing. Upon patting
Terry, the officer felt a pistol. He then reached into Terry's pocket and removed a .38 caliber
revolver. Terry was arrested, along with one of the other suspects, for carrying a concealed
weapon. Id. at 6-7. The Court determined that the officer possessed a reasonable belief that
Terry was armed and dangerous. Id. at 30.
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ever, creates significant practical problems that the Court in Long did
not address. While the Court recognized that a protective search can
only comport with the fourth amendment's proscription against unrea-
sonable searches when the scope of the search is justified by the circum-
stances which rendered its initiation permissible, 5 the Court failed to
sufficiently explicate the circumstances and limitations of a protective
automobile search. By failing to adequately establish these guidelines,
the Court may have permitted police officers to conduct searches that
cannot be justified under the fourth amendment.
II. MCHIGAN v LoNG
A. THE FACTS
In the early hours of August 25, 1977, two Barry County6 Sheriff
deputies observed David Long driving erratically and at an excessive
speed.7 Long's car swerved into a ditch, and the deputies stopped to
investigate. Long, leaving the driver's door open, met the deputies near
the back of the car. Long was slow in responding to the deputies' re-
quest for his driver's license. The deputies suspected that Long was
" 'under the influence of something.' " The deputies asked Long to
produce his vehicle registration, but instead of answering, Long began
to return to the open door of his vehicle. The deputies followed him
but, upon spotting a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's
side of Long's vehicle, prevented Long from reentering his automobile.
The deputies subjected Long to a Tery pat-down frisk,9 but found no
other weapons. 10
One of the deputies then shone his flashlight into Long's car to
search for additional weapons. The deputy spotted a small leather
pouch protruding from under the driver's armrest." The deputy ex-
amined the pouch and discovered that it contained marijuana. Long
was arrested for possession of marijuana. The deputies then searched
the trunk of Long's car and found 75 pounds of marijuana.
12
5 Id. at 18-19; Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3480-81.
6 Barry County is in the state of Michigan.
7 Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469-3473 (1983).
8 Id.
9 A pat-down frisk is a protective search to locate weapons that may be immediately used
against the officer. A Tery search of an individual is generally restricted to a limited search of
the outer clothing of the suspect. Only upon feeling an object that reasonably could be a
weapon can the officer intrude under the clothing or into the pockets of the suspect. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1968).
10 103 S. Ct. at 3473.
11 Id. The trial court determined that the pouch could have contained a weapon. Id. at
3481.
12 Id. at 3473.
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The Barry County Circuit Court convicted Long for possession of
marijuana.' 3 The court denied Long's pre-trial motion to suppress the
marijuana on the grounds that the deputies conducted an invalid
search.' 4 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Long's conviction
and held that the deputies search of Long's vehicle was a valid weapon
search under Tery.15 The Michigan Supreme Court reversed that deci-
sion. The court found that Terry allowed only a limited search of an
individual's outer clothing, and did not extend to an area search of a
car.16
B. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Before reaching the merits of Long, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, 17 addressed a jurisdictional issue. Long claimed that the
Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to hear the case because the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision rested on an adequate and in-
dependent state ground.' 8 Long argued that the Michigan State consti-
tution provided greater protection from searches and seizures than the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. Justice
O'Connor, however, held that when a state court's decision is interwo-
ven with federal law, the Supreme Court will take jurisdiction over the
case unless the lower court "make[s] clear by a plain statement in its
judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the
purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the
court has reached."'
9
13 People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. 338, 388, 288 N.W.2d 629, 629 (1979), reu'd, 413 Mich.
461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
14 Id. at 340-41, 288 N.W.2d at 630.
15 Id. at 347, 288 N.W.2d at 632. The Court found that the search of Long's trunk was a
valid inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opperman,
the police conducted a standard inventory of the entire contents of a car impounded for
multiple parking violations. They discovered marijuana in the glove box and subsequently
arrested Opperman, the car's owner. The Supreme Court held that this standard caretaking
procedure was reasonable because of an owner's significantly diminished privacy expectations
in a car, a need to protect owners from loss of property, protect police from claims over lost
property, and protect police from physical danger. Id. at 367-69.
16 People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982), reo'd, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
The search of the trunk was held to be invalid because it was the result of an arrest following
an invalid search of the car's interior. Id. at 473, 320 N.W.2d at 870; see Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471,484 (1963) (prosecutors may not use evidence seized during an unlawful
search against the victim of the search).
17 Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined in Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion.
18 103 S. Ct. at 3474.
19 Id. at 3476. Justice O'Connor recognized that the Court has not developed a consistent
approach for determining whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear a case in which
the adequacy and independence ofstate grounds is not clear. Id. at 3474-75. In the past, the
Court had dismissed cases unless it was clear that the lower court had based its decision on
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In its decision, the Michigan Supreme Court had relied exclusively
upon federal law except for two references to the state constitution.
20
The United States Supreme Court found that this failed to constitute a
plain statement that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision rested on
adequate and independent state grounds.2 1 Consequently, the Court
determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the case.
Justice O'Connor then proceeded to the substance of the case. The
majority in Long held that a Terry frisk was not limited to a pat-down
search of a person. 22 Justice O'Connor used the principles articulated in
Terr, to establish the basis for a protective weapon search of an automo-
bile passenger compartment.
A Terry stop permits a police officer, without probable cause to ar-
rest, to make a reasonable investigatory stop and protective search of a
person.23 Because a Terry stop is not subject to the warrant clause of the
fourth amendment, 24 the validity of a stop and frisk is tested by the
federal grounds. See, e.g., Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52, 54 (1934). The Court had also
vacated or continued such cases so that the state court could clarify the basis for its decision.
See,e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940). In another case, the Court had
refused a respondent's request to have the state court clarify the grounds for its decision even
when that decision rested in part on state grounds, because of the state court's extensive
reliance on federal grounds. Oregon v. Kennedy, 102 S. Ct. 2083 (1982). At other times, the
Supreme Court had examined the state law in an attempt to resolve the issue. See, e.g., Texas
v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
Justice O'Connor found that these prior alternatives for deciding to take jurisdiction
were unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, outright dismissal of such cases is unsatisfactory
because uniformity in federal law cannot be achieved when the Supreme Court fails to review
an opinion that rests primarily upon federal grounds but where that basis is not clear from
the four corners of the opinion. Second, vacation and continuance are unacceptable because
of the delay, the decrease in administrative efficiency, and the significant burden placed upon
the state court when called upon to demonstrate the presence or absence of the Court's juris-
diction. Third, it is unsatisfactory for the Supreme Court to examine state law because the
Court is generally unfamiliar with the state laws, and the parties often have not fully argued
those laws. 103 S. Ct. at 3475.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, expressed his belief that the Court's new
approach will increase the danger of advisory opinions without enhancing administrative effi-
ciency. Id. at 3483 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens, dissenting, stated that the Court's new approach to resolving the issue of
jurisdiction defies the doctrine of stare decisis. According to Justice Stevens, cases in which a
state court has "overprotected" the citizen are not of inherent interest to the Supreme Court.
The Court should not stretch its jurisdiction to reverse a state court's decision to set a criminal
free. Id. at 3491-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens claimed that an historic presump-
tion exists against taking jurisdiction when it is unclear whether state grounds are dependent
upon federal law. Id. at 3489 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Steven's greatest concerns,
however, were the conservation of the scarce federal resources of the Supreme Court, and the
Court's burgeoning docket. Id. at 3491 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20 People v. Long, 413 Mich. at 471 n.4, 472-73, 320 N.W.2d at 869 n.4, 870.
21 103 S. Ct. at 3477.
22 Id. at 3479.
23 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 30-31.
24 A stop and frisk encounter requires "swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot obser-
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fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 25 The reasonableness of the search is determined by a test
which balances the need to search 26 against the invasiveness of the
search.27 The Supreme Court in Terry concluded that an officer's safety
outweighed the invasiveness of the protective search in an investigatory
encounter.
28
The Court in Long concluded that Teny did not restrict a protective
search for weapons to the body of the suspect. 29 While Teny authorized
only a protective pat-down search of a person, Justice O'Connor noted
that the factual circumstances of the particular investigatory encounter
in Ter7n constrained the Court's holding.30 Thus, the Court in TenY did
not "develop at length . . . the limitations which the Fourth Amend-
ment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons."
'3'
vations of the officer on the beat. . . [and] historically [this conduct] has not been, and as a
practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure." Id. at 20.
25 Id. Only unreasonable searches and seizures are forbidden by the fourth amendment.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 358 (1974). The
Supreme Court has stated that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967). The Supreme Court, however, has "jealously and carefully drawn" excep-
tions to this rule. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). These exceptions can be
grouped into three categories: "consent searches, a very limited class of routine searches, and
certain searches conducted under circumstances of haste that render the obtaining of a search
warrant impracticable." Amsterdam, supra, at 358. Under the third category, a warrantless
search can be made of a motor vehicle when an officer has probable cause to believe that the
object of the search is in the car. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)
(search of automobile was valid when agents had probable cause to believe that the automo-
bile contained contraband). Likewise, a warrantless search of an arrestee, and the area within
the arrestee's immediate control, is permitted after a valid custodial arrest based on probable
cause. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). In Robinson, a police officer
searched a crumpled cigarette package found in the arrestee's pocket. The Court held that
incident to a lawful custodial arrest, an officer is allowed to fully search the arrestee. Id. at
236; see also infra note 33.
26 The primary interest furthered by a protective search is the safety of the police officer.
The Court in Tery concluded that it is clearly unreasonable to deny an officer the power to
neutralize the threat of physical harm by checking a suspect for weapons when the officer
reasonably believes the suspect may be armed and dangerous. 392 U.S. at 24.
27 The Supreme Court has found that a protective weapon search of the exterior of a
suspect's clothing is a "severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security" and
"an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Id. at 24-25.
28 Id. at 27.
29 103 S. Ct. at 3479.
30 The Supreme Court in Long noted that
"[t]he opinion in Tery authorized the frisking of an overcoat worn by defendant because
that was the issue presented by the facts. One could reasonably conclude that a different
result would not have been constitutionally required if the overcoat had been carried,
folded over the forearm, rather than worn. The constitutional principles stated in Tery
would still control."
Id. at 3479 n.12 (quoting People v. Long, 413 Mich. at 475-76, 320 N.W.2d at 871 (Coleman,
C.J., dissenting)).
3' Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3479 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
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The majority then elaborated on the justification for a protective
search of a car's interior. Justice O'Connor emphasized the danger
posed by investigatory stops of suspects in motor vehicles. She pointed
out that a suspect's access to weapons, and not merely the presence of a
weapon hidden in the suspect's clothing, may endanger a police of-
ficer.3 2 Relying on Chimel v. California33 and New York v. Belton,34 the
Court recognized that the passenger compartment of a car is under the
control of a suspect, and is an area from which a suspect can acquire a
weapon.
35
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Michigan Supreme Court's
finding that a suspect under the control of an officer does not have im-
mediate access to his vehicle, and thus, does not have control of weapons
hidden in the car.36 Justice O'Connor stated that a suspect can still gain
access to his vehicle by breaking away from the officer, or by being per-
mitted to reenter his vehicle to retrieve something from it.
37
Consequently, the Court, after balancing the interests, concluded
that when a police officer possesses a reasonable belief that a suspect is
dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, the officer
may conduct a limited protective search of the passenger compartment
of the suspect's vehicle.
3 8
In order for an officer to reasonably believe that a suspect is armed
and dangerous, the officer's belief must be based on "specific and articu-
late facts which, when taken together with rational inferences from
those facts," reasonably lead the officer to conclude the search is war-
ranted.3 9 The majority in Long concluded that the sheriff deputies pos-
sessed a reasonable belief that Long was dangerous because Long had
just driven his car into a ditch, he had appeared intoxicated, he was
32 Id. at 3480.
33 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chzinel, the Supreme Court recognized that a suspect has access
not only to weapons hidden on his person, but also to weapons hidden in an area within the
suspect's immediate control. Thus, the Court held that incident to an arrest, it is reasonable
to search "the area 'within . . .[the arrestee's] immediate control' " so that the arrestee can-
not gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Id. at 763.
34 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In Be/ton, the Court stated that in a situation involving an indi-
vidual with his car, the area within that person's immediate control includes the "relatively
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of. . .[the] automobile. Id. at 460. In Belton,
the occupants of an automobile were arrested for possession of marijuana. After the arrest,
the officer searched the car and found cocaine in a zipped pocket of Belton's coat which was
located on the back seat. Id. at 456. That search was held to be valid under the principles of
Chime/. The Court in Be/ton defined the area within the suspect's immediate control as en-
compassing the passenger compartment of a car, and any containers found within. Id. at 460.
35 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3480.
36 Id. at 3481.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Tery, 392 U.S. at 21.
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slow in answering questions, the incident had taken place in a rural area
early in the morning, and Long was about to reenter a car in which the
officers had spotted a large hunting knife.4 The officers had appropri-
ately limited their search to those areas of the car over which Long had
immediate control and that could have contained a weapon.4 1 There-
fore, "[t]he officers did not act unreasonably in taking preventive meas-
ures to ensure that there were no other weapons in the car."
'42
Justice Brennan, dissenting,43 stated that a Ter , stop authorizes no
more than a limited search of the outer clothing of a person for weapons,
not a search of a person's car based on mere reasonable suspicion.44 Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, the majority in Long improperly relied upon
Chime and Belton because both cases involved a search incident to a
lawful custodial arrest based on probable cause instead of a Te ry-type
protective search.
45
Furthermore, Justice Brennan claimed that the majority in Long
failed to distinguish between the scope and purpose of a Terry search.
The scope of the search is determined not only by the purpose, but also
by the intrusiveness of the search. 46 Justice Brennan argued that because
the search of a suspect's unoccupied car is more intrusive than a pat-
down search of the suspect, the Court improperly applied Teny to an
40 103 S. Ct. at 3481.
41 Id. The Court in Trry stated that the scope of a protective search is limited to "an
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for
the assault of the police officer." 392 U.S. at 29. In Long, the deputy shone his flashlight only
into the car's passenger compartment. The officers found a leather pouch which could have
contained a weapon, and thus, the officer justifiably examined the contents of the pouch. 103
S. Ct. at 3473, 3481; f. Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 409-10, 318 N.E.2d 895, 900-
01 (1974) (search of small opaque leather pouch found during Terry search of an automobile
was invalid because the pouch was so small that it could not conceivably have contained a
weapon).
42 103 S. Ct. at 3481.
43 Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in his dissent.
44 Justice Brennan relied on United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983), which de-
scribed the search authorized by Terry as a "limited search for weapons" or "frisk." Long, 103
S. Ct. at 3484 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2642). Justice Brennan
characterized the search in Long as a "far cry from a 'frisk' and certainly not. .. 'limited.'"
Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3484 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Place, the police detained an airline passenger's luggage based on a reasonable belief
that his luggage contained narcotics. While the seizure of Place's luggage was unreasonable
because it extended over a period of two days, the Court determined that the principles of
Terry permitted an officer to briefly detain luggage and investigate the circumstances that
aroused the officer's suspicion. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2644-45.
45 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3484 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The sole purpose of a protective
search is to discover hidden weapons that may be used against the officer or others nearby.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. A search incident to arrest, while justified in part by the necessity to
protect the officer, is also justified by the need to preserve evidentiary matter. See Robinson,
414 U.S. at 234; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
46 103 S. Ct. at 3486 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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area search which exceeds the requisite limited scope.47
Justice Brennan then concluded that the majority's reliance on a
balancing test was inappropriate.48 He noted that the Court in Dunaway
v. New York had stated that a balancing test is used only when an intru-
sion falls far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest.
49
Probable cause must be present when the severity of the intrusion ap-
proaches that of an arrest.5 0 According to Justice Brennan, an area
search is "precisely 'the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest' ";51
balancing the relevant interests is unjustified because an area search
cannot be sustained in the absence of probable cause.
52
III. ANALYSIS
The principles developed in Terry justified the protective area
search of the passenger compartment of Long's automobile. The interest
of protecting police officers in investigatory encounters by permitting a
limited search of the passenger compartment of the suspect's motor vehi-
cle outweighs the intrusiveness of the protective search. The scope of an
automobile search, however, like the scope of a pat-down frisk, must be
properly limited by the justifications of officer safety.
A. THE APPLICATION OF TERRY TO AN AUTOMOBILE SEARCH
1. The Limitations of a Terry Search.: Exceeding the Pat-Down Frisk
The Supreme Court has never limited the scope of a Terry search to
the body of a person. In Terry, the Court held that an officer who rea-
sonably believes a suspect to be armed and dangerous may conduct a
limited pat-down search of the outer clothing of the suspect for the sole
purpose of discovering concealed weapons.5 3 The Court examined the
method of the search in light of the standard that justified the search .
4
Thus, in Terry, the policeman's method of searching was appropriate
47 Id. at 3486-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 3487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979). In Dunaway, the police had picked up the suspect, brought
him to police headquarters for questioning, and placed him in an interrogation room where
he would have been physically restrained if he had tried to leave. The police neither formally
arrested the suspect, nor did they have probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 203. The Court
determined that this seizure was unlawful because it was indistinguishable from a traditional
arrest and thus required probable cause. Id. at 212.
50 Id. at 212-13.
51 103 S. Ct. at 3487 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212). Inci-
dent to arrest, an officer is permitted to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment
of the arrestee's automobile. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see supra note 34.
52 103 S. Ct. at 3487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
54 Id. at 29.
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because the scope of the search only encompassed what was necessary to
discover whether the suspect was armed.5 5 Because the Court limited its
holding to the factual circumstances of the particular case, it did not
examine the spectrum of degrees of intrusiveness associated with
searches other than a pat-down frisk.56 Furthermore, the Court explic-
itly stated that it did not develop the fourth amendment limitations on
protective searches.
57
Moreover, the Supreme Court expanded Terry in a subsequent case
to permit a protective search not commenced with a pat-down frisk. In
Adams v. Williams,58 an informant tipped off a police officer about a man
alleged to be dealing narcotics and carrying a gun in his waistband.
5 9
The suspect was seated in a car and the police officer asked him to get
out. When the man refused to do so, the officer reached through the
open window and immediately removed a concealed revolver from the
man's waistband. The Court in Adams, relying on Terry, found that
"[u]nder these circumstances the policeman's action in reaching to the
spot where the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited in-
trusion designed to insure his safety, and . . . was [therefore]
reasonable." 60
The Court in Adams permitted a protective search without an ini-
tial pat-down frisk because the circumstances prevented the officer from
neutralizing danger through less instrusive means. 6' Likewise, the prin-
55 The officer in Teny' "confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to
learn whether the men were armed." Id. at 30.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 29. The Court stated that this is not an "occasion to canvass in detail the consti-
tutional limitations upon the scope of a policeman's power when he confronts a citizen with-
out possible cause to arrest him." Id. at 16.
58 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
59 Id. at 14445.
60 Id. at 148. The officer justifiably searched the suspect even though his information was
not based on personal observation but on the observations of an informant. Because the
suspect failed to step out of the car at the officer's request, "the revolver allegedly at. . . [the
suspect's] waist became an even greater threat." Id. at 148. Professor LaFave has suggested
that "the suspect's failure to respond to the officer's order to alight from the vehicle made it
impossible for the officer to carry out an effective pat-down or to conduct even a partial pat-
down without putting himself into a much more dangerous position vis-a-vis the suspect." 3
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4, at 125 (1978).
6t Adam, 407 U.S. at 148. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a case decided
prior to Adams, the Supreme Court had found that a search conducted by an officer who
thrust his hand into the suspect's pocket without an initial exploration was invalid not only
because the search was motivated by the officer's improper purpose in looking for drugs, but
because its scope was too extensive. Id. at 64-65. The search in Siron, however, failed not
because of its increased intrusivenessper se, but because it was unnecessarily intrusive in that a
less intrusive manner of searching would have secured the officer's safety. The Court noted
that the manner of "[t]he search was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment
of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception-the protection of the
officer." Id. at 65.
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ciples of Teny do not preclude further inquiry into the reasonableness of
a protective search of the passenger compartment of a suspect's automo-
bile if the scope of the search is minimally necessary to insure the of-
ficer's safety.
62
2. The Balancing Test: Reasonableness and the Automobile Search
In Long, the Court relied upon Teny and applied a balancing test to
determine the reasonableness of a protective search of an automobile
passenger compartment without probable cause.63 The majority prop-
erly applied the balancing test to this automobile search.
In Dunaway v. New York, 64 the Court stated that "[t]he narrow intru-
sions involved in [Tery] . . .were judged by a balancing test rather
than by the general principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be
supported by the 'long prevailing standards' of probable cause. . . only
because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated
with an arrest. '65 Thus, a seizure that approaches a level of intrusive-
ness generally associated with an arrest activates the traditional safe-
guard of an arrest-probable cause.
66
In Long, Justice Brennan stated that a search of the passenger com-
partment of an automobile is "precisely" the type of intrusion associated
with an arrest.67 Thus, he reasoned, one cannot balance the interests68
because probable cause is required in all automobile searches. 69 A
search incident to an arrest, however, is more intrusive than a Terry au-
tomobile search. A search incident to a lawful custodial arrest has not
only a different purpose, but a different permissible scope than a Teny
protective search of an automobile.
70
In a search incident to custodial arrest, a police officer may conduct
62 See infra text accompanying notes 79-85.
63 Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481 (1983).
64 442 U.S. 200 (1979); see supra note 49.
65 Id. at 212.
66 Id. at 213-14.
67 103 S. Ct. at 3487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68 Essentially, no need exists to "balance" the interests in a search incident to a lawful
custodial arrest because a balancing test has already taken place. In an arrest, "the requisite
'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principles
that [these types of] seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by probable cause." Dunaway,
442 U.S. at 214. Thus, it is patently unreasonable for police officers to arrest suspects without
probable cause.
69 103 S. Ct. at 3487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70 A Tery protective search also has a different permissible scope than other car searches
for which probable cause is necessary. A search of a car based on probable cause allows an
officer to search any container which could conceal the sought-after item. Moreover, the
search may extend to the trunk of the automobile. See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157,
2172 (1982) (allowing an officer with probable cause to believe that contraband is hidden in a
car to search any container in which the object could reasonably be found).
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a very thorough search of a suspect 7' and the passenger compartment of
the suspect's car. 72 The purposes of a search incident to arrest include
not only the discovery of weapons, but also the discovery and protection
of evidence. 73 Therefore, when searching an individual, the officer is not
restricted to a protective pat-down of the arrestee's clothes, 74 but may
conduct a thorough search of the passenger compartment of the arres-
tee's vehicle and examine the contents of any containers found therein
regardless of whether they may conceal a weapon.
75
A protective weapon search, on the other hand, is less intrusive
than a search incident to an arrest because the search must be restricted
to those areas in which a weapon could be hidden. 76 The principles of
Ter, do not permit an officer to search a container found after a pat-
down when that container could not hold a weapon. 77 The Court in
Long restricted the protective automobile search to the passenger com-
partment of a car, and further limited the search to those areas in which
a weapon may have been placed or hidden.78 Thus, because a Terry
search of an automobile is less intrusive than a search incident to arrest,
the Court properly applied the Terry balancing test to a protective auto-
mobile search.
3. The Interests Involved: The Primacy of Ofer Safey
When using a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a
search, the Court weighs the need to search against the invasion which
the search entails. The officer's safety and the safety of others nearby is
the immediate justification for a protective search of an automobile.
79
The Court in Terry recognized the need for law enforcement officials to
protect themselves and prospective victims by conducting a protective
71 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
72 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981).
73 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234.
74 In a search incident to an arrest, "the officer must feel with sensitive fingers every posi-
tion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and
armpits, waistline and back, the groin area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs
down to the feet." Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming Ciminals, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 481, 481 (1954).
75 The authority to search incident to custodial arrest will permit a search of "containers
[that] will sometimes be such that they could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the
criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested." Belton, 453 U.S. at 461.
76 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3480.
77 Professor LaFave has noted that a "container [withdrawn from the suspect's pocket]
should not be opened unless it might contain a weapon, a judgment which the officer should
be expected to make on the basis of its size, weight and feel." 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60,
§ 9.4, at 132.
78 103 S. Ct. at 3480; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
79 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3479.
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search of a suspect who may be armed and dangerous.8 0 The resultant
intrusion on the suspect's personal sanctity did not outweigh the interest
of police officer safety; thus, a limited intrusion designed to protect a
police officer can be a reasonable search under the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court in Chimel recognized that protecting a police
officer could involve more than just removing weapons from the cloth-
ing of a suspect. The officer could be physically harmed as a result of a
suspect's access to weapons in an area within the suspect's immediate
control."' In addition, the Court in Belton recognized that the passenger
compartment of an automobile and any containers therein are in an
area into which the suspect could reach for a weapon.
82
The Court in Long appropriately used these two cases of search inci-
dent to arrest to analyze a Terry stop of an automobile. The majority in
Long relied upon Chimel merely to indicate that the Court has previously
recognized that weapons hidden within a suspect's reach pose a danger
to police officers. Likewise, the majority in Long used Belton only to point
out that the passenger compartment of an automobile and any contain-
ers therein are within the reach of the suspect. Thus, although Long did
not involve a search incident to arrest, the Court used Chimel and Belton
only to identify a potential source of police danger, and to note that in
the absence of a protective search of an automobile, the interest of of-
ficer safety is not secured. 3 While the Court in Long noted the gravity of
an intrusion into a suspect's automobile,8 4 the Court, consistent with the
principles of Terry, determined that a proper balance of the interests
favored officer safety. 5 This conclusion is a logical extension of Tery
and its progeny.
B. THE DIFFICULTIES OF APPLYING A PROTECTIVE SEARCH TO THE
AUTOMOBILE
L Determining the Amount of Evidence for Reasonable Suspicion
Under Terry, an officer may conduct a protective search only when
he reasonably concludes that a suspect is armed and dangerous.8 6 Not
all stops call for a Tery search. 87 When an officer reasonably believes
80 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
81 See supra note 33.
82 See supra note 34.
83 103 S. Ct. at 3480 n.14.
84 Id. at 3481. The search in Terry was also severely intrusive. Tey, 392 U.S. at 24-25; see
supra note 27.
85 103 S. Ct. at 3479-80.
86 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
87 The question of "whether it is proper to make a protective search incident to a stopping
for investigation is a question separate from the issue of whether it is permissible to stop the
suspect." 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 9.4, at 115.
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that the suspect has committed a violent crime, however, the right to
search is concomitant with the right to stop the suspect.8 In other types
of crimes "such as trafficking in small quantities of narcotics, possession
of marijuana, illegal possession of liquor, prostitution, bookmaking, or
vagrancy," other circumstances must be present to justify a Terry
search. 89 Typical circumstances include "a characteristic bulge in the
suspect's clothing; observation of an object . . . which might be a
weapon; an otherwise inexplicable sudden movement toward a . . .
place where a weapon could be concealed;. . . and awareness that the
suspect had previously been armed."' 9
Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Long that "the Court's re-
quirement that an officer have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is
armed and dangerous does little to check the initiation of an area
search." 9' In Long, a large hunting knife, an apparently intoxicated
driver, a dark night, and a rural area combined to prompt a weapon
search of Long's car.92 Aside from possessing a large hunting knife,
David Long was not readily distinguishable from numerous other intox-
icated late night drivers. The Court did not explicitly state whether, in
the absence of Long's hunting knife, the officer could have conducted
the protective search. If the officer could have searched anyway, the
Court in Long would have authorized car searches based on little more
than inebriation and the hour of the night.
The Court, however, emphasized that the officers did not frisk
Long until after they had observed the hunting knife.9 3 Thus, one could
reasonably conclude that Long's apparent intoxication and the late
hour of the night were not decisive factors, and that without the obser-
vation of the knife, the officers could not have properly searched the car.
A Terry stop of a taciturn, confused, and somewhat inebriated individual
is more closely grouped with nonviolent crimes like bookmaking, va-
grancy, and trafficking in small quantities of narcotics for which the
right to search is founded upon additional circumstances, than with
dangerous crimes from which the right to search automatically flows
from the right to stop. Therefore, the Court in Long most likely con-
cluded that a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the suspect's car
88 Se id. at 116; Ten,, 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
89 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 9.4, at 117 (footnotes omitted); see Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977) (an officer who ordered a lawfully stopped traffic violator
out of the car was permitted to search him when the officer observed a bulge that could have
been a weapon).
90 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 9.4, at 117, 118 (footnotes omitted).
91 Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3486 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 3481.
93 Id. The Court also stated the the search of Long's person could be justified after the
discovery of the knife. Id. at 3481 n.15.
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established the requisite "other circumstances" permitting a Terry
search.
Terry requires not only that a police officer have a reasonable suspi-
cion that the suspect is armed, but also that the suspect is dangerous.
94
In most Terry stops, if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is
armed, "then it will follow that there is the requisite suspicion that he is
dangerous because [the suspect] is confronting an officer who is investi-
gating the possibility that he is engaged in criminal conduct. '95 In a
Terry encounter with a suspect and an automobile, it is unclear when an
officer may reasonbly conclude that a suspect is armed and dangerous.
A police officer may presume that typical weapons such as guns or
knives within the passenger compartment of the suspect's car are always
dangerous. Automobiles, however, will often contain items that could
conceivably make effective weapons but which are not in any way in-
tended for that purpose (e.g., a baseball bat, a hammer, a tire iron, or a
steel tow chain). An officer who reasonably believes that a suspect has a
concealed tire iron strapped to his body would, following Terry, be per-
mitted to frisk that individual because the officer may reasonably as-
sume that the suspect intends to use the tire iron as a weapon.96 But an
officer cannot so readily conclude that the presence of a tire iron on the
floor of a car can similarly be the impetus for a protective search of the
entire passenger compartment. Because the presence of a tire iron in a
car may be ordinary and generally benign, it is not necessarily an accu-
rate indicia of the dangerousness of the suspect.
9 7
An officer's safety is not jeopardized by a suspect who is not danger-
ous. A protective search that is not justified by the need to protect the
officer or others nearby is unreasonable.98 Thus, protective searches of
the passenger compartment of a car based solely upon the presence of a
tire iron or a baseball bat may result in frequent violations of the fourth
amendment because of the low correlation between the presence of these
objects and the dangerousness of the suspect.
2. Detennining the Suspect's Area of Immediate Control
Terry principles permit an extension of a protective search from the
body of a suspect to the passenger compartment of a car and the con-
94 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
95 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 60, § 9.4, at 114 n.17.
96 St¢,e.g., People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208, 216,397 N.E.2d 733, 736, 422 N.Y.S.2d 43,46
(1979) (police officer was justified in taking two long sticks from defendant because the sticks
could pose a danger to the officer if the suspect became violent).
97 A tire iron in a car could pose a danger to a police officer. A tire iron within the reach
of an ostensibly irrational suspect could reasonably lead an officer to conclude that the sus-
pect is dangerous because of his access to this potential weapon.
98 Teny, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 29.
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tainers therein only when an officer reasonably believes that a suspect is
dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. 99 Because a
suspect can only gain immediate control of weapons from his automo-
bile when he is in control of his automobile, it is necessary to determine
when the passenger compartment of a vehicle is within the suspect's im-
mediate control.
Incident to a custodial arrest, an officer may search the passenger
compartment of the arrestee's car. The justification for this search, in
part, is that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passen-
ger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not in-
evitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon.' "10 The Court in Long recognized that a suspect who is
not arrested may similarly gain access to weapons.' 0 ' A number of cir-
cumstances exist, however, in which the subject of a Terry stop would
not have immediate access to his vehicle.10 2 For example, a suspect who
has walked back to a patrol car some distance from his own automobile
may not have immediate access to his automobile.
03
The exigencies of an investigatory stop involving an automobile
may make it difficult to determine precisely when the suspect has imme-
diate control of items in his car. Consequently, courts may draw a
bright line and conclude that suspects have immediate control of the
interior of their cars regardless of their position in or outside the car. 1
0 4
Officer safety can be secured, however, without establishing a general
rule that an officer can always search a suspect's automobile because of
the possibility of the suspect's future access to the interior of his car.
A suspect who is in the control of police officers may gain immedi-
ate control of his automobile by either breaking away from the officers,
or by being permitted to reenter the vehicle. A suspect capable of
breaking away from an investigating officer and reaching his car is in
99 See id. at 27, 30.
100 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 454, 460 (1981) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
101 103 S. Ct. at 3480.
102 Professor LaFave has noted that there are "a number of commonplace events which
would put the passenger compartment beyond the arrestee's [or the suspect's] control-imme-
diate removal of him. . . to some other place away from his vehicle, .. [and] closure of the
vehicle, .. among others." 3 W. LAFAVE, supra 60, § 7.1, at 158 (Supp. 1983).
103 See State v. Greenwald, 369 So.2d 1317, 1319 (La. 1979)(tied bag inside suspect's auto-
mobile is not within area of immediate control when suspect is outside the vehicle with his
hands on its roof); People v. Pagliarulo, 41 A.D.2d 563, 564, 340 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136-37 (1973)
(mem.) (revolver in automobile passenger compartment out of reach when suspects were
standing on the sidewalk and the door of the car was closed). Contra Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71,
82, 628 S.W.2d 284, 289, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 180 (1982) (inside of suspect's automobile was
within area of control even when suspect was standing behind car with his hands on the
trunk).
104 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
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immediate control of his vehicle. Consequently, Tery principles do not
proscribe a protective search of the passenger compartment of the cars
of suspects capable of breaking away from the investigating officers.
Courts need not presume, however, that every suspect is capable of
breaking away from the investigating officer because certain circum-
stances may effectively preclude a suspect from entering the passenger
compartment of his car. For example, in many situations the police of-
ficers may be between the suspect and his locked car door. Therefore,
the Court should require the police officer to determine whether a sus-
pect may gain control of his automobile from the particular factual cir-
cumstances of the individual encounter. 105 The validity of the
protective search, then, would turn on whether the police officer reason-
ably believed that even though the suspect was under the control of the
officers, he was still capable of breaking away and acquiring access to a
weapon.
Police officers also may expressly permit a suspect to gain access to
his automobile either during or after the Terry investigation. 10 6 If the
need arises for the suspect to retrieve something from his car during the
investigation, then at that time, if the officer reasonably believes that the
suspect is dangerous and will gain access to weapons upon entering the
vehicle, the officer can conduct a Terry search of the suspect's
automobile.
Likewise, at the conclusion of the Terry investigation, if the suspect
has not been arrested, the suspect will be allowed to reenter the automo-
bile.10 7 At that time, the suspect will have access to any weapons hidden
in the vehicle. If, at the conclusion of the investigation, the officer rea-
sonably believes that the suspect may harm the officer, then the princi-
ples of Terry allow the officer to search the suspect's vehicle for weapons.
Because a suspect by this time has successfully concluded the encounter
with the police officer and is now safely ensconced in the automobile,
however, it is unlikely that the suspect will wish to reestablish contact
with the law by trying to harm the officer.' 0 8 Thus, although situations
may arise in which an officer reasonably believes that a suspect may
harm the officer even though the officer has finished the Terry investiga-
105 Teny principles already require an officer to use a reasonably prudent man standard to
determine whether the suspect is armed and dangerous. Teny, 392 U.S. at 24, 27-28.
106 Long, 103 S. Ct. at 3481-82. A suspect may be required to obtain information from
within the automobile during the Teny investigation (e.g., driver's license, automobile regis-
tration, or insurance card).
107 Id. at 3481.
108 Professor LaFave has stated that "[if] a person is stopped for running a stop sign, it
hardly seems plausible to suggest that after he is ticketed and returns to his car he will then
seize a gun and try to overtake the police car and shoot the officers." 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note
60, § 9.4, at 137 (footnote omitted).
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tion, it seems improbable that this will occur very often.' °9
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court in Michigan v. Long extended Trry to permit a protective
area search of the passenger compartment of a car. This decision is doc-
trinally consistent with the principles developed in Terry. The Court
correctly identified the passenger compartment of a suspect's automo-
bile as a place in which a suspect can conceal weapons and appropri-
ately permitted a police officer to search that area when the officer
reasonably believed that the suspect was dangerous and had immediate
access to weapons.
The Court, however, did not explicate the circumstances and limi-
tations of the protective automobile search. An officer should not com-
mence a protective search unless he reasonably believes that the suspect
intends to gain control of weapons hidden in the passenger compart-
ment of the automobile within the immediate control of the suspect. If
the police officer has control over the suspect, then the passenger com-
partment of the suspect's automobile is within the immediate control of
the suspect only when the officer reasonably determines that the suspect
is capable of breaking away from the investigating officers or when the
officer allows the suspect to reenter the car. Following these guidelines,
a protective automobile search should successfully comply with the prin-
ciples of Tery.
TIMOTHY M. ISON
109 Although the Court in Long pointed out that T7r, does not require officers to adopt
alternate measures of ensuring their safety to avoid the intrusion involved in a Teny-type
search, 103 S. Ct. at 3482 n.16, an officer's decision to search the passenger compartment of
an automobile based on the possibility that a suspect may break away from-the officer or will
be permitted to reenter the vehicle is not a choice among less intrusive means of neutralizing
a threat to officer safety. Rather, it is a determination as to whether an officer is actually in
danger as a result of a suspect's access to weapons. Thus, this decision is similar to decisions
officers already make under Teny. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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